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Wendy K. Mariner †

I. INTRODUCTION
Upon the death of a king or queen, the proclamation “the king is dead, long live
the king” announces a new monarch’s accession to the throne, preserving the
sovereign order. As the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA) 1 is
implemented, it is tempting to proclaim the reign of a new system of health
insurance. But, will it preserve the old order or initiate a new form of governance?
As states and insurers grapple with new rules and regulations being issued from the
Department of Health and Human Services, the Treasury Department and the
Department of Labor, one might believe an entirely new health insurance system is
being built. Yet, the ACA is designed to preserve existing forms of public and
private health insurance, such as Medicare and private employer group health plans,
which will continue to operate much as they have in the recent past. 2 What has
changed is the role that insurance will play and how that will shape the way we think
about health policy.
Under the ACA, health insurance will function more like social insurance than
conventional indemnity insurance. 3 Consequently, the new queen may look more
like a prime minister—no longer reigning as a sovereign, but responsible to her
subjects and accountable to their governing institutions. This represents a notable
change, but it is less dramatic than one might suspect, as health insurance has long
functioned differently from other categories of insurance.
Health insurance no longer operates like conventional life or car insurance, as it
did in the 1950s and 1960s, when health insurance began displacing direct cash
payments from patients to physicians. Blue Cross and Blue Shield offered indemnity
policies to reimburse patients for fees patients paid to physicians and hospitals. 4
Even then, however, Blue Cross and Blue Shield characterized their policies not as
†
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1
Patient Protection & Affordable Care Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (codified
as amended in scattered sections of 21, 25, 26, 29, 42 U.S.C.).
2
See generally PAUL STARR , R EMEDY AND R EACTION : T HE PECULIAR AMERICAN STRUGGLE
OVER H EALTH C ARE R EFORM 177 (2011).
3
See id. at 241-47.
4
See generally R OBERT C UNNINGHAM III & R OBERT C UNNINGHAM , JR., THE B LUES : A
HISTORY OF THE B LUE C ROSS AND B LUE SHIELD SYSTEM (1997).
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insurance, but as hospital and medical service payment plans, respectively; and they
were governed by state laws similar to, but distinct from, other insurance licensure
statutes. 5 As healthcare costs rose, commercial insurers entered the market with
indemnity policies. In the early years, insurers typically paid whatever prices
hospitals and physicians charged, but today’s insurers negotiate prices with
providers, and large insurers that have substantial bargaining power can set their
own prices. Insurers also added managed care components to their plans to control
costs, 6 and in many cases insurance coverage determines the kind of care that
patients receive in practice.
Today, health insurance is no longer simply a class of insurance that covers
risks to health, and it has not been so for many years. 7 Part II argues that health
insurance has become a unique form of insurance—a mechanism to pay for
healthcare that uses risk spreading as one of several pricing methods. 8 Part III
explains how the ACA builds on this important payment function to create a
complex social insurance system to finance healthcare for (almost) everyone. Health
insurance is now so integrated into the healthcare system that we can no longer have
one without the other. This shift poses challenges to laws governing health insurance
policies. Part IV, therefore, examines how the ACA draws on various conceptions of
insurance to produce a quasi-social insurance system. Such a system poses new
challenges to laws governing insurance, not all of which are resolved by the ACA
itself. I conclude that, whether or not the ACA is fully implemented, health
insurance has already changed—but more nuanced questions remain about whether
and how laws governing insurance licensure and claims determinations should also
change.
II. CHARACTERISTICS OF HEALTH INSURANCE
Health insurance today differs from other classes of insurance in three critical
respects.9 First, it is the primary source of payment for medical care in the United
States.10 Second, because everyone needs healthcare, almost everyone needs health
5
R OBERT D. E ILERS, R EGULATION OF B LUE C ROSS AND B LUE SHIELD PLANS 135-36 (1963). For
an example of such licensure statutes, see Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 176A (2012 & Supp. 2013), 176C
(2012).
6
See generally ALAIN C. E NTHOVEN , HEALTH P LAN : T HE ONLY PRACTICAL SOLUTION TO THE
SOARING C OST OF M EDICAL C ARE (1980); Gail Jensen et al., The New Dominance of Managed Care:
Insurance Trends in the 1990’s, 16 HEALTH AFF. 125 (1997); Marsha Gold, Can Managed Care and
Competition
Control
Medicare
Costs?,
W3
HEALTH
AFF .
176
(2003),
http://content.healthaffairs.org/content/early/2003/04/02/hlthaff.w3.176.full.pdf?origin=pub lication_d
etail.
7
See generally Jon Gabel et al., The Changing World of Group Health Insurance, 7 HEALTH
AFF. 48 (1988); Jon Gabel et al., Withering on the Vine: The Decline of Indemnity Health Insurance,
19 HEALTH AFF. 152 (2000); Wendy K. Mariner, Social Solidarity and Personal Responsibility in
Health Reform, 14 C ONN. INS. L.J. 199, 206-13 (2008).
8
Wendy K. Mariner, Health Reform: What’s Insurance Got to Do with It? Recognizing Health
Insurance as a Separate Species of Insurance, 36 AM. J.L. MED. 436, 438 (2010); Nat’l Fed’n of
Indep. Bus. (NFIB) v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2620 (2012) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting in the
judgment in part and concurring in the judgment in part).
9
See generally Brief of 104 Health Law Professors as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners,
NFIB
v.
Sebelius,
132
S.
Ct.
2566
(2012),
available
at
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publications/supreme_court_preview/briefs/11 398_petitioneramcu104healthlawprofs.authcheckdam.pdf (written together with Mark Hall, the aut hor
who organized and participated in drafting the brief (along with Abbe Gluck), the characteristics of
which are described in Part II, infra.)
10
Id. at 16.
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insurance to pay for that care. 11 Third, health insurance is no longer designed like
conventional insurance policies and thus no longer functions like conventional
insurance. 12 Any one of these characteristics is enough to distinguish health
insurance from conventional indemnity insurance, but together they make health
insurance unique. Indeed, healthcare may be the only market that could not exist in
its current form—providing today’s sophisticated services—without third party
payers.13
A. PUBLIC AND PRIVATE COVERAGE PAYS FOR MOST MEDICAL CARE
Americans pay for most of their healthcare with health insurance, not cash. In
2009, they used public and private insurance to pay for 85.7% of their personal
healthcare expenditures. 14 Only 12.8% was paid out-of-pocket for insurance
deductibles and co-payments, over-the-counter medication costs and other health
service expenses not covered by insurance. 15
The vast majority of health insurance payments go directly to providers to pay
for care—medical services, procedures, medications and devices. 16 The practice of
reimbursing patients for their out-of-pocket payments to providers is the exception
today.17 When a person needs medical care, her health insurance pays the physicians,
hospitals and laboratories for the services rendered to the patient. In this respect,
both private commercial health insurance and public benefit programs like Medicare
function in the same manner. Thus, the average person is likely to think of her health
plan as the entity that pays for her medical care. To be sure, insurance does not pay
for some services, but these are the minority—accounting for less than fifteen
percent of national personal health expenditures. 18
There is no other product that is purchased with insurance benefits. One might
argue that repairs to one’s house or car are often paid directly by homeowners or car
insurance. However, that analogy ignores an important distinction. Individuals do
not seek repairs in a vacuum. First, they must buy a house or a car with money from
their own assets or a loan. Then they may buy insurance to pay for any repairs
needed in the future. Later, if damage occurs, they may call upon insurance to pay
for repairs, but they do not use car insurance proceeds to buy the car in the first
place.
In contrast, individuals seek health insurance to buy the initial “product” —
healthcare—before seeking that care. One might claim that health insurance is like a
car loan obtained to buy the car in the first place, except that the “loan” does not
have to be repaid. Health insurance is not analogous to car insurance, unless we
11

See id. at 5.
Mariner, supra note 8, at 443.
13
See Brief of 104 Health Law Professors, supra note 9, at 7-10.
14
C TRS. FOR M EDICARE & M EDICAID SERVS., U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS.,
NATIONAL HEALTH E XPENDITURES BY TYPE OF SERVICE AND SOURCE OF FUNDS, CY1960-2012,
available
at
http://www.cms.gov/Research-Statistics-Data-and-Systems/Statistics-Trends-andReports/NationalHealthExpendData/NationalHealthAccountsHistorical.html (last modified Jan. 7,
2014).
15
U.S. CENSUS BUREAU , U.S. DEP’T OF C OMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED
STATES :
2012,
102
tbl.135
(2012),
available
at
http://www.census.gov/compendia/statab/2012edition.html (select “Section 3: Health and Nutrition”
from the menu).
16
Id. at 104.
17
Id. at 102.
18
Id.
12
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consider the human body to be the original product and health insurance as the
source of payment for repairs to the body. Of course, the human body is not a
product; the Thirteenth Amendment has prohibited treating a human being as a
commodity since 1865.19
In his opinion on the ACA’s individual mandate in National Federation of
Independent Business v. Sebelius, Chief Justice John Roberts rejected the idea that
health insurance differs from car insurance. 20 Very few things are purchased for
their own sake, he asserted: a car is purchased for transportation to go places. 21 If
health insurance is similarly purchased for an ultimate purpose, as the Chief Justice
implied, that purpose can only be to buy healthcare, which, under his reasoning, is
itself purchased for the further purpose of getting well. This theory makes
analogies—a mainstay of legal reasoning—unmanageable. At issue is the source of
payment for products or services like cars and healthcare. Intangible states of being,
like going places and getting well, are not products that can be bought. Buying
health insurance is at least one step too far removed from buying a car to satisfy the
Chief Justice’s attempt at analogy.
A. THE UNIVERSAL NEED FOR HEALTH INSURANCE
Insurance is used to pay for most healthcare because healthcare is often
extremely expensive and unpredictable. To be sure, some other purchases can be
expensive and unpredictable. But, healthcare is not an optional good. Almost
everyone needs some sort of healthcare at one time or another during their lives.22
The National Center for Health Statistics (NCHS) reports that only 1% of adults
have never visited a healthcare professional in their lifetimes. 23 Of course, the need
for healthcare varies over a lifetime. Yet, most Americans use healthcare frequently.
The same NCHS survey reports that 95.9% of adults had visited a healthcare
professional within the preceding 5 years, and 82.5% had done so within the
preceding year. 24 Children see healthcare providers even more often. 25
Much of this care is expensive. National health expenditures accounted for
17.9% of the United States GDP in 2011, totaling about $2.7 trillion. 26 Life-saving
care is especially expensive, with organ transplants costing hundreds of thousands of
dollars.27 Coronary artery bypass surgery cost $86,914 at private insurance rates in

19

U.S. C ONST . amend. XIII.
NFIB v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2591 (2012) (Roberts, C.J.).
21
Id. See also Kenneth S. Abraham, Four Conceptions of Insurance, 161 U. PA. L. R EV. 653,
671 (2013) (arguing that automobile insurance is second to health insurance in its importance to well being, because “[i]n all but urban areas where there is adequate mass transit, driving is an essential
feature of daily life”).
22
NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2610 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting in the judgment in part and concurring in the
judgement in part).
23
Nat’l Ctr. for Health Statistics, Summary Health Statistics for U.S. Adults: National Health
Interview Survey, 2009, 10 VITAL & HEALTH STAT . 1, 124 (2010), available at
http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/series/sr_10/sr10_249.pdf.
24
Id.
25
Id. at 6.
26
Micah Hartman et al., National Health Spending in 2011: Overall Growth Remains Low, but
Some Players and Services Show Signs of Acceleration, 32 HEALTH AFF. 87, 88 exh. 1 (2013).
27
T. SCOTT B ENTLEY & STEVEN G. HANSON , 2011 U.S. ORGAN AND TISSUE TRANSPLANT C OST
E STIMATES
AND
DISCUSSION
3
tbl.1
(2011),
available
at
http://www.publications.milliman.com/research/health-rr/pdfs/2011-us-organ-tissue.pdf.
20
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2005.28 Few Americans can pay for such care out-of-pocket. In 2009, the median
household income in the U.S. was $49,777, 29 and the median net worth was about
$120,000.30 More than half the population does not have enough income or assets to
pay for this type of care.
The cost is exacerbated by the unpredictability of major illnesses and injuries. 31
One never really knows when a devastating medical crisis will occur. This makes it
difficult, if not impossible, to plan or save for future care. Moreover, when illness
strikes, patients have little control over the treatments they receive—and therefore
their costs—typically relying on physician recommendations. Thus, patients are
often faced with the kind of personal and financial crises that can only be financed
by the cost-spreading techniques of insurance.
Of course, insurance is useful for expensive and unpredictable events, such as
the loss of one’s house in a fire or flood. But, few expensive products are
necessities. Food, water, shelter, and clothing are necessities, but they are not
unpredictable. Unlike medical care, these necessities are essentially the same for all
human beings. The quantity and quality sufficient to sustain survival are predictable.
Also unlike medical care, consumers can choose what clothes, housing, and food to
buy without professional intervention. These necessities generally are available at
affordable prices. To be sure, too many indigent persons are unable to afford healthy
food and safe housing without social assistance. Nevertheless, there is no imperative
to use insurance to buy food, water, housing, or clothing.
Despite many who consider healthcare to be a commercial good that should be
allocated through commercial markets, more Americans treat healthcare like a
necessity and a public good. 32 The public generally responds to an individual in an
emergency by providing rescue. 33 Professional medical ethics has long recognized
physicians’ responsibilities to help patients in an emergency. 34 State court decisions
have incorporated this ethic into common law, while state and federal legislation has
codified it for hospitals with emergency departments, requiring care for emergency
medical conditions regardless of ability to pay. 35 Even though limited to
emergencies, this sense of responsibility distinguishes medical care from
commercial goods. Medical facilities do not refuse care to anyone whose life could
be saved by immediate intervention, whether or not the facilities will be paid for the
services they provide. Commercial vendors, however, do not typically provide food,
housing, or automobiles to individuals who cannot pay for them.

28
Zhenxiang Zhao & Melissa Winget, Economic Burden of Illness of Acute Coronary
Syndromes: Medical and Productivity Costs, 11 BMC HEALTH SERVICES R ES. 1, 3 (2011).
29
U.S. CENSUS BUREAU , U.S. DEP’T OF C OMMERCE , INCOME , POVERTY , AND HEALTH
INSURANCE C OVERAGE IN THE UNITED STATES : 2010 453 tbl.692 (2011), available at
http://www.census.gov/prod/2011pubs/p60-239.pdf.
30
Id. at 6 tbl.1.
31
Joseph P. Newhouse et al., Risk Adjustment and Medicare: Taking a Closer Look, 16 HEALTH
AFF. 26, 32-33 (1997).
32
STARR , supra note 2, at 7-10.
33
PAUL S LOVIC , THE FEELING OF R ISK: N EW PERSPECTIVES ON R ISK PERCEPTION 73 (2010);
Karen E. Jenni & George Loewenstein, Explaining the “Identifiable Victim Effect”, 14 J. R ISK &
UNCERTAINTY 235, 237 (1997).
34
Code of Medical Ethics § 8.11 Neglect of Patients (Am. Med. Ass’n 1996), available at
http://www.ama-assn.org//ama/pub/physician-resources/medical-ethics/code-medicalethics/opinion811.page.
35
See generally Wilmington Gen. Hosp. v. Manlove, 174 A.2d 135 (Del. 1961); Emergency
Medical Treatment & Active Labor Act (EMTALA), 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd (2012).
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C. HEALTH INSURANCE ALSO PAYS FOR PREDICTABLE AND PREVENTIVE SERVICES
Health insurance today pays not only for needed medical care that patients
cannot foresee, but also for many entirely planned and predictable services. These
include preventive services like annual checkups and well-baby examinations,
immunizations, mammograms, and similar screening procedures, as well as
contraceptive services.
Coverage of preventive services is an anomaly in conventional insurance.
Expenses that are likely or certain to occur are not considered insurable risks. 36
Traditionally, insurance covered only risks that were unforeseeable by the insured,
for sensible reasons.37 From the insured’s perspective, it makes little sense to buy
insurance to pay for a service, like an influenza immunization, that the insured
already plans to buy. The insurance premium would be more expensive than the
price of the immunization alone.
Health insurance coverage of preventive and other planned services resulted
from both insurance regulation and market demand. State insurance licensure
legislation introduced required coverage of selected preventive services as a matter
of social policy. 38 The purpose of such laws was to encourage people who might not
bother or could not afford to get regular preventive examinations to do so in order to
avoid more serious (and costly) diseases in the future. 39 Mandated benefits for
preventive services have been a common feature of insurance regulation in most
states for many years. 40
Foreseeable medical care goes beyond prevention; it includes expected
treatment for existing medical conditions. A person with diabetes, kidney disease, or
hypertension, for example, can expect to need a variety of medical services that
would not typically be covered by traditional commercial indemnity insurance. Bo th
state and federal laws later imposed some limits, such as the length of time that
insurers could exclude coverage of preexisting conditions. 41 The ACA eliminates
these and other vestiges of traditional insurance. 42
Even before the ACA became law, health insurance had evolved, sometimes
voluntarily, sometimes with a push from government, into a singular species of
insurance. The insurance “product” that Chief Justice Roberts described was already
dying out.43 Health insurance no longer functioned exclusively as a way to spread

36

See, e.g., Stonehenge Eng’g Corp. v. Emp’rs Ins. of Wausau, 201 F.3d 296, 3 01-02 (4th Cir.
2000); SCA Serv. Inc., v. Transp. Ins. Co., 646 N.E.2d 394, 397 (Mass. 1995); STEVEN PLITT ET AL.,
C OUCH ON INSURANCE §§ 102.8-102.9 (3d ed. 2009); JEFFREY W. STEMPEL, STEMPEL ON INSURANCE
C ONTRACTS 27 (3d ed. 2006).
37
Mariner, supra note 7, at 209.
38
Id.
39
Id.
40
See M ICHAEL M ORRISEY , HEALTH INSURANCE 276 (2007) (noting growth in mandates since
the 1970s); Mark Power & August Ralson, State Mandated Group Health Insurance Coverages, 5
B ENEFITS Q. 1, 1-10 (1989) (“The number of state health benefit mandates [has] increased
dramatically over the past two decades . . . The number of mandates enacted increased from zero in
1965 to approximately 200 by 1975 and then tripled to 604 through 1986 . . . [L ]egislative interest in
state mandated health insurance coverages remains high.”).
41
See, e.g., Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA), 29 U.S.C § 1182
(2012).
42
42 U.S.C. §§ 300gg-1-13 (2012).
43
See NFIB v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2591 (2012) (“The Government argues that the
individual mandate can be sustained . . . because health insurance is a unique product.”).
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the risk of unforeseeable financial loss. It had become the way to pay for healthcare
in the United States.44
III. HEALTH INSURANCE AS SOCIAL INSURANCE
Health insurance has become as necessary as healthcare. 45 Without health
insurance, most Americans could not obtain the healthcare they need, except in
emergencies. The ACA was written in recognition of this reality. The goal of making
healthcare available to all (or virtually all) could only be financed through modern
health insurance methods. Thus, the ACA cemented a broader social function for
health insurance, employing it to serve the goal of access to affordable healthcare for
all.46
In order to enable most Americans to get care, the ACA preserved the financial
risk-spreading function of insurance for expensive care, while ending the last traces
of risk selection and underwriting that would exclude coverage of beneficial, but
predictable, services. 47 These steps were necessary to make healthcare both
affordable and available to almost the entire population, whether used by a
government program or by private insurance. 48
The ACA fills the gaps in the fragmented array of public and private health
insurance programs and links them together into a social insurance system. As Rashi
Fein has stated, the ACA is an overall program that is “compulsory for the
population group covered, contributory, and earmarked, with contributions that are
not adjusted for risk and therefore are redistributive.” 49 In this system, private health
insurance serves a function similar to that of worker compensation insurance,
unemployment insurance, Social Security, and Medicare; that is to say, it ensures
that those in need of assistance have access to a source of funding for that aid. 50
44

DAVID GOLDHILL, C ATASTROPHIC C ARE 30 (2013).
See INST . OF M ED., AMERICA’ S UNINSURED C RISIS : C ONSEQUENCES FOR HEALTH AND
HEALTH C ARE 49 (2009), available at http://www.nap.edu/catalog.php?record_id=12511 (“For people
without health insurance, there is a chasm between health care needs and access to needed services
despite the availability of some safety net services. With health insurance, children are more likely to
gain access to a medical home, well-child care and immunizations, prescription medications,
appropriate care for asthma, and basic dental services. They are also more likely to have fewer
avoidable hospitalizations, improved asthma outcomes, and fewer missed days of school. Uninsured
adults face serious and sometime [sic] grave risk to their health. Without health insurance, adults have
less access to effective clinical services including preventive care and, if sick or injured, are more
likely to suffer poorer health outcomes, greater limitations in quality of life, and premature death.
When adults gain health insurance, they experience improved access to effective clinical services and
better health outcomes.”).
46
STARR , supra note 2, at 241. Care for “all,” of course, remains something of an overstatement,
since twenty-three states, as of this writing, have declined to participate in the Medicaid expansion.
Moreover, the ACA does not require undocumented aliens to have insurance coverage. KAISER
FAMILY FOUND ., THE IMPACT OF THE C OVERAGE GAP IN STATES NOT E XPANDING M EDICAID BY R ACE
AND
E THNICITY
2
(2013),
available
at
http://kaiserfamilyfoundation.files.wordpress.com/2013/12/8527 -the-impact-of-the-coverage-gap-instates-not-expanding-medicaid.pdf.
47
See STARR, supra note 2, at 240-41.
48
See generally JACOB S. H ACKER , THE D IVIDED WELFARE STATE : T HE B ATTLE OVER PUBLIC
AND P RIVATE S OCIAL B ENEFITS IN THE U NITED S TATES 3 (2002).
49
Rashi Fein, Advancing a Single-Payer System of Social Insurance, in SOCIAL WELFARE
POLICY AT THE C ROSSROADS: R ETHINKING THE R OLES OF SOCIAL INSURANCE , TAX E XPENDITURES,
M ANDATES, AND MEANS-TESTING 87, 87 (Robert B. Frieland et al. eds., 1994).
50
See R OY LUBOVE , THE STRUGGLE FOR SOCIAL SECURITY 3 (1970) (“Social insurance was
proposed as an alternative to the existing, but inefficient, system of economic assistance. Operating
independently of the poor laws, it would respond predictably and adequately in the event of an
45
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Tom Baker and Deborah Stone have noted that risks covered by insurance are
often viewed as risks that should be shared by a community. 51 Richard Ericson and
colleagues explain that insurance is “a moral technology” in the sense that it
“defines how people should act.” 52 Jeffrey Stempel has described the insurance
policy itself as a social institution, “often acting as adjunct arms of governance and
reflecting social and commercial norms.” 53 As more people are able to obtain health
insurance, whether public or private, the idea of having health insurance becomes
routine and expected. Because insurance is a means of spreading costs, the
expectation of health insurance suggests that the cost of healthcare is a shared
responsibility—at least to the extent of the benefits it covers.54
In the most fundamental sense, Chief Justice Roberts was correct to characterize
the ACA’s individual mandate as a tax. 55 Premiums paid for social insurance
function much like taxes. As Henry Aaron noted, the payroll taxes that fund Social
Security and Medicare are analogous to insurance premiums, except that the payroll
taxes are more regressive than income taxes, because they are the same percentage
of income, up to a cap, for everyone. 56
In a 1927 Supreme Court case concerning taxes on insurance premiums, Justice
Oliver Wendell Holmes famously wrote in a dissenting opinion, “[t]axes are what
we pay for civilized society, including the chance to insure.”57 In Justice Holmes’s
view, the premium tax is a paid for the social and economic protections provided by
the state, including the opportunity to conduct business in a fair and secure
environment. Today’s insurance premiums are analogous to such taxes. Even when
paid to private industry, they finance the care needed to live and work in society.
IV. IMPLICATIONS FOR HEALTH INSURANCE
Why should it matter that health insurance has become the primary method of
paying for healthcare and a form of social insurance? There are at least two reasons.
First, the shift challenges the conventional conception of insurance as a voluntary,
commercial relationship between insurer and insured, but it does not necessarily
offer universally acceptable, normative standards on how insurance law should
respond to this “new” relationship. This injects some new uncertainties into an area
of law already beset by competing conceptions of the role of insurance in general.
Second, recognizing health insurance as a payment system should focus more
attention on the kinds of care that should be available to everyone. If health
insurance is to function as a form of social insurance, who decides what coverage is

individual’s exposure to the long- and short-term risks which interrupted income flow: accident,
sickness and maternity, old age and invalidity, unemployment, or death resulting in im poverished
dependency.”).
51
TOM B AKER, E MBRACING R ISK 27 (Tom Baker & Jonathan Simon eds., 2002); Deborah Stone,
Beyond Moral Hazard: Insurance as Moral Opportunity, 6 C ONN . INS. L.J. 11, 46 (1999).
52
R ICHARD V. E RICSON ET AL., INSURANCE AS GOVERNANCE 10 (2003).
53
Jeffrey W. Stempel, The Insurance Policy as Social Instrument and Social Institution , 51 WM.
& M ARY L. R EV. 1489, 1495 (2010).
54
See M ICHAEL J. GRAETZ & JERRY L. M ASHAW , TRUE SECURITY : R ETHINKING AMERICAN
SOCIAL INSURANCE 167-71 (1999).
55
See NFIB v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2608 (2012).
56
Henry J. Aaron, Mandated Benefits with a Social Insurance Option, in SOCIAL WELFARE
POLICY AT THE C ROSSROADS 87, 87 (Robert B. Frieland et al. eds., 1994).
57
Compania Gen. De Tabacos De Filipinas v. Collector of Internal Revenue, 275 U.S. 87, 100
(1927) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
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essential? Government regulation and private market contracting are likely to offer
different, albeit also incomplete, answers. Each of these is discussed below.
A. A SOCIAL INSURANCE CONCEPTION OF HEALTH INSURANCE
The ACA’s social insurance conception of health insurance partially straddles
four conceptions of insurance delineated by Kenneth Abraham. 58 The “contract
conception” is what Abraham calls the “traditional and dominant conception of
insurance . . . as a contract transferring risk of loss to a party whose business is
selling such contracts, rather than as an incident of another transaction.” 59 The
“product conception” views the insurance policy more like a commodity than a
contract; the product could be found defective under rules, like products liability,
defining the validity of contract terms, rather than generally deferring to the text of
standard form contracts used in insurance to define rights and obligations. 60 The
“public utility/regulated industry conception” views insurance much like a natural
monopoly, such as the water or electricity markets, which are highly regulated “in
order to serve the public interest.” 61 The “governance conception,” first propounded
by Richard V. Ericson and colleagues, 62 describes how insurance functions much
like (and can serve as a substitute for) a government to the extent that it influences
the behavior of those insured to prevent or mitigate risks. 63
Elements of each of these conceptions of insurance are discernable in the ACA,
but none wholly encompasses the overall function of the healthcare financing
methods that the ACA contemplates. Of course, Abraham’s analysis focuses on
private insurance, whereas health insurance—pre- and post-ACA—includes both
private plans and public programs. To be sure, the ACA intensifies regulation of
private, commercial health insurers and their policies. Abraham notes that health
insurance is the insurance field most closely aligned with the public utility
conception. 64 But he concludes that it is not a complete match, because, unlike
public utilities, which charge consumers according to their use of the service, health
insurance under the ACA redistributes risk. 65 Medicare, Medicaid, and the Veterans
Affairs health benefits programs might also share some similarities with public
utilities, but they are more properly viewed as government benefit or entitlement
programs—redistributive tax and transfer programs—and not regulated industries.
In a social insurance system, a health plan is a means rather than an end—a
method of financing expected costs, rather than a commercial contract or product to
58

Abraham, supra note 21, at 657.
Id. at 658. A key focus of the contract conception is the degree to which the contract’s text
governs the specific losses for which the insurer will pay, as well as the rules for interpreting that text.
60
Id. at 674-75. For a discussion of the product conception, see generally Jeffrey W. Stempel,
The Insurance Policy as Thing, 44 TORT TRIAL & INS. P RAC . L.J. 813 (2009); Daniel Schwarcz, A
Products Liability Theory for the Judicial Regulation of Insurance Policies, 48 WM. & M ARY L. R EV.
1389 (2007).
61
Abraham, supra note 21, at 668.
62
E RICSON ET AL., supra note 52, at 53; see also Stempel, supra note 53, at 1495.
63
Abraham, supra note 21, at 683-84.
64
Id. at 670. Given the redistribution of former monopolies, such as telephone services, into
competing private companies, the traditional public utility model that Abraham describes applies to a
narrower set of industries today. Companies offering competing landline and mobile telephone, cable,
or wireless internet services, for example, might offer a modified model of public utilities, with
somewhat less regulation, especially with respect to pricing, than traditional public ut ilities.
65
Id. at 672.
59

204

AMERICAN JOURNAL OF LAW & MEDICINE VOL. 40 NO. 2&3 2014

reimburse stipulated losses. Under the ACA, redistribution of risk—or the costs of
healthcare—is a central goal, which is characteristic of social insurance. Thus,
legislation and regulations are likely to dominate health policy decision-making in
order to ensure that private health insurance plans serve the ACA’s goals. This
contrasts with the contract conception of an entirely private market, where contracts
are the predominant regulator of commercial relationships, rights and duties. Most
commercial health insurance policies are ordinary consumer products that are sold in
the market to voluntary purchasers on the basis of ability to pay, on the seller’s
terms and conditions embodied in standard form contracts, with minimal regard to
individual consumer needs. 66 As discussed below, the contract conception remains
alive and well within the ACA’s framework, because contracts will continue to
specify many details of the insurer-insured relationship, including entitlement to
specific treatments. 67 Nonetheless, when insurance is used to finance a goal like
access to healthcare, the insurance contract or “product” itself must be designed to
achieve that goal, instead of other goals the insurer may prefer.
In the public financing systems, like Medicare and healthcare for military
personnel and soldiers, legislation specifies the legal and policy framework for an
entire program, with administrative rules filling in the details. When multiple private
insurers are used to finance healthcare, more complex regulation is needed to ensure
that private entities, working independently, offer insurance plans that are designed
to achieve the public goal of financing healthcare.68 The more a financing system
relies on the private sector, the more regulation of private entities will be required to
achieve the overall goal. This means that legislation and regulations will
increasingly shape the boundaries of health insurance coverage and pricing.
The ACA continues to rely on the states to license and regulate insurers and
their policies, but it also imposes new federal requirements. Insurance
commissioners now need to regulate according to federal as well as state law. This
includes evaluating the actuarial value of qualified health plans to be sold on health
insurance exchanges, 69 as well as medical loss ratios, risk corridors, 70 and risk
adjustments. 71 State regulators also are to work with the Secretary to develop
uniform explanations of health plans for consumers 72 and reporting requirements for
insurers.73 Although federal funding is available to build up state regulatory capacity
to review premium increases, 74 many states are likely to remain underfinanced for
the increased level of scrutiny their insurance commissioners are expected to
provide.75 Some insurance departments barely have enough staff members to make
66

Id. at 658, 674-75.
See discussion infra Part IV.B.2.
See, e.g., TIMOTHY JOST , NAT’L ACAD . OF SOC. INS., THE R EGULATION OF PRIVATE HEALTH
INSURANCE
29-31
(2009),
available
at
http://www.nasi.org/usr_doc/The_Regulation_of_Private_Health_Insurance.pdf
(describing
the
increased frequency of regulatory interventions needed to address market failures in U.S. private
health insurance that do not appear in a single payer system).
69
42 U.S.C. § 18022(d)(2) (2012).
70
Id. § 18062(a).
71
Id. §§ 18022(c)(4), 18063. Beyond qualified plans, insurance regulators remain responsible for
catastrophic plans, id. § 18022(e), child-only plans, id. § 18022(f), separate plans for dental and
mental health services, grandfathered plans sold to large employers and other non-qualified plans.
72
Id. § 300gg-15.
73
Id. § 300gg-17.
74
Id. § 300gg-94(c).
75
See KENNETH S. ABRAHAM , INSURANCE LAW AND R EGULATION 142 (5th ed. 2010)
(describing the variation in resources available to insurance commissioners in different states).
67
68
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sure that insurers are financially solvent, much less to review each policy for its
actuarial soundness and compliance with pre-ACA consumer protection rules. 76
Now, they must also determine whether the policies offered on health insurance
exchanges comply with all the federal rules. 77
State insurance departments may also need to review and approve insurers’
participation agreements with providers, since these agreements may be key to
ensuring that premiums are adequate to cover expected outlays. 78 Moreover, if
consumers are supposed to choose health plans wisely, they may need to know how
an insurer pays its providers and perhaps even how providers pay themselves. 79 This
requires more transparency than is currently provided.80 Payments to providers are
likely to be the primary target for cost control. There is little dispute that such
payments have grown faster than the cost of living or that provider prices often
appear arbitrary. 81 The ACA authorizes experiments to encourage providers to work
together to provide care more efficiently at lower prices in accountable care
organizations and other arrangements, but providers still have little incentive to
reduce their own incomes without pressure from insurers. 82 The degree to which
76
See id. at 142 (emphasizing the constrained budgets and staffing conditions in insurance
departments).
77
42 U.S.C. § 18021. To see how complicated this might become, consider the Final Rules under
the Paul Wellstone and Pete Domenici Mental Health Parity and Addiction Equity Act of 2008. See
generally External Review for Multi-State Plan Program, 78 Fed. Reg. 68,240 (Nov. 13, 2013) (to be
codified in scattered sections of 26 and 45 C.F.R.). Health insurers have typically carved out mental
health benefits and subcontracted with a separate insurer or organization that made coverage (and
medical necessity) determinations largely independently, or at least their criteria were not necessarily
applied in the same way as how the primary insurer applied its own coverage criteria for medical care.
Primary insurers may have to do some complex mapping of coverage, deductibles, co -pays,
participating providers, and numbers of visits to establish parity. Insurance commissioners may have
to review and approve such parity estimates.
78
Providers are aware of the external pressure to keep their prices low, but are consolidating in
order to gain bargaining power. Most estimates say that consolidation typically yields a three percent
increase in prices. Health Care Industry Consolidation: Hearing Before the Comm. on Ways & Means
Subcomm. on Health, 112th Cong. 13-18 (2011) (statement of Martin Gaynor, E.J. Baron Professor of
Economics and Health Policy, Heinz College, Carnegie Mellon University) (noting that in different
geographic markets, hospital mergers have been shown to increase prices by anywhere from five
percent to over fifty percent).
79
For a thoughtful study of the information consumers need to choose insurance plans, see Erik
J. Johnson et al., Can Consumers Make Affordable Care Affordable? The Value of Choice
Architecture, 8 PLOS ONE 1 (2013).
80
Most insurers keep their provider payment systems proprietary. Even government employers
often sign nondisclosure agreements if they receive information from insurers as well as third party
administrators and management consultants; were it not for these nondisclosure agreements, provider
payment data could be subject to FOIA requests.
81
Steven Brill, Why Medical Bills Are Killing Us, TIME , Feb. 20, 2013, at 1, 16-55.
82
Medicare’s governing legislation requires CMS to set physician payment rates annually. Social
Security Act §1848(d). The statutory formula for Sustainable Growth Rates (SGR) has required
reductions in payment rates since 2002, but Congress has postponed enforcement of those reductions
annually. Were the cumulative reductions to take effect in 2014, Medicare payments to physicians
would decline by about twenty-four percent. Letter from Jonathan D. Blum, Principal Deputy
Administrator, Ctrs. For Medicare & Medicaid Servs., to Glenn M. Hackbarth, Chair, Medicare
Payment Advisory Comm’n (Mar. 11, 2014), available at http://www.cms.gov/Medicare/MedicareFee-for-Service-Payment/SustainableGRatesConFact/downloads/medpacfinal.pdf; Sustainable Growth
Rates and Conversion Factors, C TRS. FOR MEDICARE & M EDICAID SERVS. (last modified Apr. 15,
2014), http://www.cms.gov/Medicare/Medicare-Fee-for-Service-Payment/SustainableGRatesConFact/
index.html?redirect=/sustainablegratesconfact/01_overview.asp. Some of the estimated federal
savings expected from ACA reforms were based on the assumption that Medicare would reduce its
costs by implementing the SGR. Recently, legislators began to consider whether to replace the fee for
service physician payment structure with methods that reward quality and cost saving, like the
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such organizations accept the financial risk of providing care raises additional
questions for insurance regulation. 83 States may have to decide whether to regulate
providers who accept risk (through an accountable care organization, for example)
as insurers or impose alternative requirements to ensure their financial soundness. 84
B. WHO DECIDES WHAT COVERAGE IS OFFERED AND PAID FOR?
A threshold question for any social insurance system is what coverage must be
offered. While the ACA intends to provide more uniform coverage through its
requirement for Essential Health Benefits (EHB),85 the decisions most important to
patients—what treatment their own insurance will pay for when they get sick—turn
out to be more complex under the ACA’s financing structure than under a national,
public social insurance system.
What qualifies as essential care is a question that has vexed policy makers for
decades. 86 A threshold question is: essential for whom? An individual’s view of
what is essential care may differ from a societal perspective. Moreover, different
individuals may have different opinions on what is essential. Some may value
quality of life more than length of life, while others prefer the opposite. 87 Some may
prefer care that maintains or restores normal function, while others simply want to
survive, regardless of disability. 88 Some may think of healthcare as limited only to
services that diagnose, treat or cure disease, while others may include services to
prevent illness or even achieve optimal health status. Furthermore, an individual’s
own preference may vary, depending upon whether she acts as a consumer buying
insurance or a patient in need of care for herself or a loved one. 89

bundled payments used for hospital services or global payments for accountable care organizations.
Gail R. Wilenksy, Improving Value in Medicare with an SGR Fix, 370 NEW E NGL. J. M ED. 1 (2014).
For Medicare programs, see Innovation Models, C TRS. FOR M EDICARE & M EDICAID SERVS.,
http://innovation.cms.gov/initiatives/index.html#views=models (last visited May 8,2014). Agreements
between CMS and provider ACOs under the Medicare Shared Savings Program allow the provider
organization to share savings (reductions in the amount of Medicare payments to the ACO from
payment amounts in an earlier benchmark period) without subjecting ACOs to risk for financial losses
from providing care. Patient Protection & Affordable Care Act § 3022, 42 U.S.C. § 1395jjj (2012).
Regulations and Guidance on the Medicare Shared Savings Program may be found at
http://www.cms.gov/Medicare/Medicare-Fee-for-Service-Payment/sharedsavingsprogram/Statutes_
Regulations_Guidance.html. CMS may consider adding shared risk in its new Innovation Program; see
42 U.S.C. § 1315a. CMS issued a Request for Information seeking suggestions by March 1, 2014, for
new ACO models that encourage greater care integration and financial accountability. CTRS. FOR
M EDICARE & M EDICAID SERVS., C TR. FOR M EDICARE & M EDICAID INNOVATION , R EQUEST FOR
INFORMATION : E VOLUTION OF ACO INITIATIVES AT CMS 1 (2014), available at
http://innovation.cms.gov/Files/x/Pioneer-RFI.pdf.
83
For a discussion of earlier experiences with regulating risk-bearing providers, see Allison
Overbay & Mark A. Hall, Insurance Regulation of Providers that Bear Risk, 22 AM. J.L. & M ED. 361
passim (1996).
84
For one state’s proposal to impose tiered levels of financial requirements on providers who
accept varying levels of risk, see 1251 Mass. Reg. 20 (Jan. 3, 2014).
85
42 U.S.C. § 18022 (2012). See Part IV.B.1, infra.
86
See generally DANIEL C ALLAHAN , WHAT KIND OF LIFE : THE LIMITS OF M EDICAL PROGRESS
(1990); NORMAN D ANIELS, JUST HEALTH C ARE (1985); VICTOR R. FUCHS, WHO SHALL LIVE ?
HEALTH , E CONOMICS, AND SOCIAL C HOICE (1974); E DMOND D. PELLIGRINO & D AVID C.
THOMASMA, FOR THE P ATIENT ’ S GOOD : T HE R ESTORATION OF B ENEFICENCE IN HEALTH C ARE
(1988).
87
See C ALLAHAN , supra note 86, at 18-20.
88
See DANIELS, supra note 86, at 2-5.
89
Wendy K. Mariner, Standards of Care and Standard Form Contracts: Distinguishing Patient
Rights and Consumer Rights in Managed Care, 15 J. C ONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL ’Y 1, 12-18 (1998).
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Societal level views of essential care also vary. Indeed, one could question
whether some societies accurately or adequately represent any consensus on the part
of their populations. Where governments act honestly, essential care could properly
be based on many different factors, such as population size, age distribution, and
available resources. What is essential to any society may also depend on its need for
economic growth, which may favor services that preserve productivity, or
participation in civic life, which may favor other services, or some other human
function. But, given the variation in individual preferences in a population as diverse
as that of the United States, any societal level choice, no matter how thoughtfully
produced, may conflict in whole or in part with the views of individuals or groups
within the population.
1. Essential Health Benefits under the ACA
Majority rule may—or may not—be the appropriate normative standard to
determine essential care at the more abstract level of general categories of coverage.
The ACA appears to assume that it is by requiring private insurers to cover EHB in
all plans that they offer to sell on a health insurance exchange or in the individual
and small group market (but excluding grandfathered plans of large employers). 90
EHB must be similar in scope to a “typical employer plan” and must include the
following ten categories of medical services: ambulatory; emergency; inpatient
hospitalization; maternity and newborn; mental health and substance abuse;
prescription drugs; rehabilitation; laboratory; preventive; and pediatric (including
dental and vision care).91 The Federal Secretary of Health and Human Services is
charged with defining EHB, and is required to take the following specific
“considerations” into account: the categories must be balanced, without giving undue
weight to any one category; coverage should not discriminate on the basis of age,
disability, or expected length of life; EHB should take into account the needs of
diverse groups, including women, children, and people with disabilities; benefits
should not be denied on the basis of age, expected length of life, present or predicted
disability, degree of medical dependency, or quality of life. 92
This general definition of EHB is quite comprehensive, and the “considerations”
make it difficult to narrow the categories or to make decisions about how they might
apply to individual patients. 93 So far, this rather vague and flexible definition of
EHBs is based on state choices of typical small employer plan coverage—in effect,
trickling up from insurers. 94 But it does represent a step toward developing
90

42 U.S.C. §§ 18021-18022 (2012).
Id. § 18022(b)(1).
Id. § 18022(b)(4).
93
Not surprisingly, the Secretary avoided listing specific benefits, instead issuing a rule granting
the states the opportunity to decide what benefits plans will cover in their states. Essential Health
Benefits, Actuarial Value, and Accreditation, 78 Fed. Reg. 12,833-12,872 (Feb. 25, 2013) (to be
codified at 45 C.F.R. pts. 147, 155-56). A state may choose one of several existing health plans sold to
small employers in that state (called a “benchmark plan”), and the benefits covered by that plan will
be deemed to qualify as EHB. The benchmark plan, however, must be supplemented if it fails to cover
any of the 10 required categories. Id.
94
See id. While ACA states that Essential Health Benefits should be similar in scope to the
benefits covered by a “typical employer plan,” it does not distinguish between large employer plans
and small employer plans. Small employer plans typically offer fewer benefits and more limited
coverage of those benefits than large employer plans in order to keep premiums affordable. Thus, a
typical small employer plan usually has a lower actuarial value than a large employer plan. To counter
rising premiums, companies have increased the amounts that employees pay for health plans —both
the employee’s share of premiums and deductibles and co-payments for receiving care. See Steven
91
92
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consensus on the basic types of care that should be available to all. The benefits
covered by large employee group plans are already similar. Greater consensus on
essential coverage may emerge in the future, ideally with public input, and national
standards may begin to trickle down from the state or federal government to
insurers. Experiments with Medicare and Medicaid coverage and provider payment
methods also may begin to incorporate the same or similar conception of essential
health benefits, so that benefit packages in both public and private health plans may
converge more closely than in the past. 95 Of course, supplementary private insurance
and personal funds will undoubtedly remain available to pay for elective and
boutique services. Nonetheless, similar public and private benefit packages would
reinforce consensus on what counts as care to which everyone should have access.
Similar coverage across many plans facilitates comparisons for consumers. In
theory, consumers need only compare prices for the same set of benefits. In health
insurance, however, a plan’s participating providers are also a major factor in
consumers’ choice of health plans, even if often secondary to price.
2. Coverage and Treatment Decisions – Contracts Again
Paradoxically, variation in EHB definitions can perpetuate a problem that the
EHB requirement itself was intended to resolve or at least reduce—inconsistent or
inadequate treatment coverage. Historically, the fact that different insurers covered
different benefits meant that people with the same medical condition would not
necessarily receive the same treatment. 96 The remaining variation among the several
public benefit programs and hundreds of private insurance plans can provoke
complaints of unfair rationing, especially if a person who is denied treatment
believes that the denial was not based on medical need, but on an insurer’s profit
targets. 97 More uniform coverage of the same benefits could avoid the rationing
charge by assuring that everyone is subject to the same rules. The knowledge that
resources are being used for a public purpose, such as providing needed education or
Blakely, Employers, Workers, and the Future of Employment-Based Health Benefits, 330 E MP.
B ENEFIT R ES. INST . 4 (2010). The ACA, however, limits out-of-pocket co-payments. 42 U.S.C. §
18022(c)(2). Moreover, a small employer may have few affordable choices, so its plan may not cover
the benefits that employees prefer. However, since the majority of people who will be entering the
market are individuals and employees of small businesses, it may make sense to use a small employer
plan as a benchmark.
95
See, e.g., Additional Information on Proposed State Essential Health Benefits Benchmark
Plans, C TRS. FOR M EDICARE & M EDICAID SERVS., http://www.cms.gov/CCIIO/Resources/DataResources/ehb.html (last visited Apr. 9, 2014); Michelle Lilienfeld, Overview of HHS’ Proposed Rule
on Benefits for the Medicaid Expansion Population: A Step Guide for Advocates, NAT’L HEALTH LAW
PROGRAM
(Apr.
1,
2013),
http://www.healthlaw.org/issues/medicaid/health-reform-andmedicaid/overview-of-hhs-proposed-rule-on-benefits-for-the-medicaid-expansion-population-a-steguideffor-advocates#.UymmYqDIpLE (discussing Medicaid Alternative Benefit Plans, which starting
in 2014 are required to either meet all ten EHB benefit categories or be supplemented to make them
comparable to a relevant EHB-based benchmark plan).
96
See Amanda Cassidy, Essential Health Benefits, HEALTH AFF., HEALTH POL’Y B RIEF 1-2 (May
2, 2013),. http://healthaffairs.org/healthpolicybriefs/brief_pdfs/healthpolicybrief_91.pdf (noting the
historical absence of a uniform national standard for health insurance benefits and discussing the vast
differences in coverage among plans before the Affordable Care Act required coverage of essential
health benefits).
97
See Normal Daniels, Why Saying No to Patients In The United States Is So Hard – Cost
Containment, Justice and Provider Autonomy, 314 NEW E NG . J. M ED. 1380, 1383 (1986) (noting that
patients are distrustful of health care schemes that make a profit through denial of care); Wendy K.
Mariner, Rationing Health Care and the Need for Credible Scarcity, 85 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 1439,
1442 (1995) (“[Patients] may fear they are being denied care so that the money can be used to profit
the organization.”).
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services for children, can increase public acceptance of limits as a shared sacrifice .
On one hand, the breadth of the statutory definition of EHB will make it difficult to
limit the total package of benefits. On the other hand, the Secretary’s decision to use
state-based benchmark plans to define EHB means that the details of each benefit
category will continue to vary, so that individuals might still complain of unfair
treatment, thereby threatening public acceptance.
While the ACA intends to provide more uniform coverage of EHBs, the process
of determining what kinds of care patients receive may not dramatically change for
the foreseeable future. Most insurance plans and benefit programs necessarily define
covered benefits in quite general terms much like the statutory definition of EHB.
Given the breadth of required coverage, the decisions most important to patients
—exactly what treatment will and will not be paid for within the general
categories—remain with the insurer.
Because the United States has so many different insurance plans, both the
decision maker and the law governing the determination of claims for treatment
vary. Federal government programs like Medicare prescribe general benefit
categories in legislation, but specific determinations on whether and when specific
items and services are covered are a matter of administrative law.98 The Department
of Health and Human Services, Centers for Medicare and Medicaid (CMS) issues
regulations and guidance interpreting the statute and describing what will and will
not be paid for. 99 However, the federal agency does not make decisions about
individual patient care.100 Instead, CMS contracts with private contractors to do so
on its behalf. 101 Typically, these contractors are insurance companies, which have
experience handling claims, usually because they have a separate private insurance
business of their own. 102 Different contractors handle claims in different regions of
the country, so it is possible to have inconsistency in claims determination. In the
case of disputes, patients have a statutory right to appeal the denial of payment to
Medicare’s administrative appeals process, which is a unified federal system with
greater consistency in results. 103

98
See Barbara S. Klees et al., BRIEF SUMMARIES OF M EDICARE AND M EDICAID , C TRS. FOR
M EDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS. 22 (2012), available at https://www.cms.gov/Research-StatisticsData-and-Systems/Statistics-Trends-andReports/MedicareProgramRatesStats/Downloads/MedicareMedicaidSummaries2012.pdf (stating that
federal authority to administer the Medicare and Medicaid systems has been delegated to, at various
times, the Department of Health and Human Services, the Social Security Administration, the Social
and Rehabilitation Service, and the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services).
99
See id. at 18 (organizations and agencies acting on behalf of the federal government apply
Medicare coverage rules to determine appropriate payments); Rulings, CTRS. FOR M EDICARE &
M EDICAID SERVS., http://www.cms.gov/Regulations-and-Guidance/Guidance/Rulings/index.html (last
modified Feb. 27, 2012, 2:24 PM).
100
See Kathleen M. King & James Cosgrove, Medicare: Contractors and Private Plans Play a
Major Role in Administering Benefits, GOV ’T. ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE 2-3 (Mar. 4, 2014), available
at http://www.gao.gov/assets/670/661317.pdf (providing overview of how CMS contracts with
Medicare Administrative Contractors and private organizations to provide various services); Klees et
al., supra note 98, at 18 (discussing the role of contractors in determining which services are covered).
101
See 42 C.F.R. § 405.920 (2013); Klees et al., supra note 98, at 18 (discussing fiscal
intermediaries, which are organizations or agencies that contract with the federal government to
process Medicare claims).
102
See King & Cosgrove, supra note 100, at 2 (explaining that the Medicare fee-for-service
program “was designed so that the federal government contracted with health insurers or similar
private organizations experienced in handling physician and hospital cla ims to process and pay
Medicare claims rather than having the federal government do so”).
103
42 C.F.R. § 405.904.
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Medicaid programs offer somewhat less consistency. Although Medicaid is a
federal program with legislatively prescribed benefit categories, the states administer
the program and can voluntarily, or with a federal waiver, cover additional or
alternative benefits. 104 Most state Medicaid programs make individual patient care
determinations directly through a state Medicaid administrative agency. 105 However,
most states also contract with private insurers to enroll some Medicaid beneficiaries
in a managed care plan. 106 The insurer makes the initial benefit coverage
determination for beneficiaries enrolled in its Medicaid plan. 107 Disputes, however,
are subject to a state’s administrative agency review, often with a dedicated appeals
board.108
Contract law governs individual benefit determinations for patients who are
enrolled in private insurance plans. Despite drawing on many of the same common
law principles, the judiciary in different states can apply somewhat different
substantive and procedural rules with varying results. Claims determination often
depends on specific contract provisions, especially those that exclude experimental
procedures and those that limit coverage to treatments that are medically necessary
for the individual patient. 109 Here, decision-making is likely to continue to operate
under a contract conception of insurance. That conception, however, does not
necessarily produce consistent treatment determinations for patients in the same or
similar circumstances. Indeed, doctrinal disputes that often occur in the context of
all types of insurance policies will undoubtedly continue to arise with respect to
claims determinations under health plans: the degree to which an insurance contract
should be treated as a contract of adhesion, 110 application of contra proferentem to
construe ambiguous contract terms against the insurer as drafter, 111 whether the
parties are bound by the text of contract provisions or the reasonable expectations of
the insured,112 the scope of subrogation clauses and whether state subrogation laws

104
See Klees et al., supra note 98, at 22 (“Within broad national guidelines established by
Federal statutes, regulations, and policies, each State establishes its own eligibility standards;
determines the type, amount, duration, and scope of services; sets the rate of payment for services;
and administers its own program.”).
105
Medicaid Administrative Claiming, M EDICAID . GOV , http://www.medicaid.gov/MedicaidCHIP-Program-Information/By-Topics/Financing-and-Reimbursement/Medicaid-AdministrativeClaiming.html (last visited Apr. 9, 2014).
106
See id.; Klees et al., supra note 98, at 29; Managed Care, M EDICAID . GOV,
http://www.medicaid.gov/Medicaid-CHIP-Program-Information/By-Topics/DeliverySystems/Managed-Care/Managed-Care.html (last visited Mar. 25, 2014) (discussing trends in
Medicaid, noting the growth of State-designed Medicaid managed care programs); Financing &
Reimbursement, M EDICAID . GOV, http://www.medicaid.gov/Medicaid-CHIP-Program-Information/ByTopics/Financing-and-Reimbursement/Financing-and-Reimbursement.html (last visited Mar. 25,
2014) (noting that approximately seventy percent of Medicaid enrollees get care through a managed
care delivery system).
107
42 C.F.R. § 405.920.
108
Id. § 405.908.
109
See, e.g., Loyola Univ. of Chi. v. Humana Ins. Co., 996 F.2d 895, 897 -901 (7th Cir. 1993)
(analyzing whether a transplant was covered where the contract excludes procedures that do not meet
the criteria for “medical necessity” and procedures that are “experimental” for the condition).
110
The classic analysis of contracts of adhesion is found in Friedrich Kessler, Contracts of
Adhesion—Some Thoughts about Freedom of Contract, 43 C OLUM . L. R EV. 629 passim (1943).
111
See R OBERT E. KEETON & ALAN I. WIDISS, INSURANCE LAW § 6.3(a) (1988).
112
Id.
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are preempted by Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA), 113 and the
requirements for an insurer’s defense to a claim of bad faith. 114
Most private insurers provide internal review (conducted by the insurer itself) of
enrollee complaints, including disputes over benefit denials, and the ACA requires
almost all insurers to offer a more transparent internal appeal process covering more
categories of complaints. 115 Enrollees who are dissatisfied with the internal review
decision have very different options, depending on their particular insurer and plan.
In theory, patients can sue a private insurer under state law for claims denials and
other causes of action. 116 However, the role of courts in determining claims has
diminished somewhat in the past decade, for several reasons. Perhaps the most
important has been the growing prevalence of mandatory arbitration clauses in
private insurance contracts, which preclude an enrollee from bringing a lawsuit to
require payment for treatment or to recover damages for negligence or other
violations of law. 117 The United States Supreme Court has also limited the causes of
action available to patients who are enrolled in an employer’s group health plan. 118
Patients in such plans who claim wrongful denial of benefits must sue the
employer’s plan under the federal Employee Retirement Income Security Act, not
state law. 119 If successful, the patients are entitled to recover only the cost of the
treatment denied and not any damages for personal injury. 120
A third reason for fewer court actions is the growth of external review systems.
Almost all states now require insurers to submit certain disputes to a review panel
that is entirely independent of the insurer. 121 Having one’s claim reviewed by an
unbiased expert or group of experts often satisfies patients that their claims have
been evaluated fairly, regardless of the outcome. 122 The ACA greatly expands the
use of external review panels, requiring their use for almost all insurers, except
certain employer-sponsored group health plans. 123
The ACA leaves in place a multiplicity of processes and decision-makers for
determining individual claims, including public administrative procedures, private
review procedures, private arbitration, and judicial process. 124 The Act does not
specify how decisions are made in individual cases. With rising healthcare costs,
both public and private insurers are likely to face pressure to make sure that t hey pay
113

See, e.g., U.S. Airways, Inc. v. McCutchen, 133 S. Ct. 1537 (2013).
See, e.g., Bjornstad v. Senior Am. Life Ins. Co., 599 F. Supp. 2d 1165, 1174 (D. Ariz. 2009)
(allowing plaintiffs to bring a claim of bad faith against administrator of home health care insurance
policy for offering conflicting bases for denying coverage of services rendered after patient’s health
condition required transfer out of the home and into a nursing facility); McEvoy v. Grp. Health CoOp, 570 N.W.2d 397 (Wis. 1997).
115
42 U.S.C. § 300gg-19(a) (2012).
116
See, e.g., Love v. Fire Ins. Exch., 271 Cal. Rptr. 246 (App. Ct. 1990).
117
See, e.g., Engalla v. Permanente Med. Group, 938 P.2d 903 (Cal. 1997).
118
See, e.g., Aetna v. Davila, 542 U.S. 200 (2004); Pegram v. Herdrich, 530 U.S. 211 (2000).
119
29 U.S.C. § 1132(a) (2012).
120
Davila, 542 U.S. at 221.
121
Right to Health Insurance Appeals Process, NAT’L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES,
http://www.ncsl.org/research/health/right-to-health-insurance-appeals-in-aca.aspx (last updated March
2013).
122
See Rush Prudential HMO, Inc. v. Moran, 536 U.S. 355, 366 (2002).
123
42 U.S.C. § 300gg-19(b) (Supp. 2011); Internal Claims, Appeals & External Review
Processes, 76 Fed. Reg. 37,207-37,234 (June 24, 2011) (to be codified in scattered sections of 26, 29,
45 C.F.R.); Plan Management: Regulations, C TRS. FOR MEDICARE & M EDICAID SERVS.,
www.cms.gov/cciio/resources/Regulations-and-Guidance/index.html#Plan%20Management
(last
visited March 14, 2014).
124
Internal Claims, Appeals & External Review Processes, 76 Fed. Reg. at 37,207-37,234.
114

212

AMERICAN JOURNAL OF LAW & MEDICINE VOL. 40 NO. 2&3 2014

only for care that offers value for money. 125 Thus, different decision makers may
continue to produce different interpretations of what individual patients are entitled
to under their different health plans. 126 Even where courts issue opinions, their
decisions often focus on the specific circumstances of an individual patient and
therefore create little precedent for other individual decisions. 127
3. The Role of Costs
Using health insurance as a financing mechanism has the potential to reshape
the healthcare delivery system. Today’s healthcare system was strongly influenced
by what health insurance plans covered and excluded and how much they paid
providers.128 A financing system must decide what services are worth paying for and
how much to pay for them. Ultimately, healthcare must be affordable to everyone,
not just those who voluntarily buy insurance. With everyone in the system, savings
cannot be achieved by risk selection or exclusion from coverage, as with voluntary,
commercial insurance. Contributions or premiums of individuals in the group need
not correspond to their individual risks; individual contributions, whether in
premiums or taxes, may be relatively equal or income based, as long as aggregate
revenues are available to pay for the needs of everyone in the group.129
This means increased pressure to control healthcare costs, with greater scrutiny
of payments to providers and taking value more explicitly into account. 130 Although
a major impetus for the Act was the growing cost of care, 131 the ACA does not
expressly require either reductions or changes in the method of payment for
healthcare.132 Instead, supporters believe that once everyone is insured, the country
will have no choice but to take affirmative steps to control costs. 133 Since most of the
125
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ACA’s reforms do not take effect until 2014, noticeable cost control is unlikely for
many years. 134 Competing goals of essential coverage and affordable costs have
already challenged the process of making Medicare coverage decisions 135 and
developing a standard Essential Health Benefits package. 136 This means that the
rising cost of care will significantly affect the kind of care that insurance actually
pays for, at least for some years to come.
In practice, insurers still bear primary responsibility for controlling costs, but
their options are limited. The requirement that insurers cover EHB, however defined,
constrains insurers’ ability to limit benefits as a way to control costs. The ACA also
limits the permissible extent of cost-sharing for patients, which is another traditional
way to shift costs. 137 In principle, insurers could reduce their own administrative
costs and profits, but new regulations, such as reporting requirements, 138 may add to
administrative efforts, and for-profit companies are under pressure from investors to
increase profits. 139 One ACA skeptic argues that the ACA’s requirement that
insurers spend at least eighty percent of premiums on benefits could backfire by
encouraging insurers to increase premiums and cover more services for the purpose
of preserving executive compensation and profit levels. 140
This leaves provider payments as a primary target for controlling costs.
Although payment is a strong influence on provider behavior, it remains a crude
instrument for reducing waste. Insurers do not necessarily have the expertise to finetune payment mechanisms to achieve both financial efficiency and medical
effectiveness in individual treatment decisions. This raises the question, noted
above, of whether insurance regulators should assume responsibility for overseeing
insurer payments to providers. 141 To complicate matters, if providers in ACOs are
responsible for providing care, but specific items and services are not specified in
the contract, it will be providers who make the decisions about exactly what the
patient receives. 142 In case of a dispute, who is responsible—the insurer, the
provider, or both? Such questions are reminiscent of earlier controversies over
medical necessity determinations by managed care organizations. 143 Should it matter
whether the provider has accepted full or partial financial risk for patient care? If the
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insurance department regulates providers who accept risk, should the department
also regulate individual treatment decisions?
V. CONCLUSION
Over the past four decades, health insurance has evolved from its original
indemnity structure into the primary means of paying for healthcare. The ACA
gathers various public benefit programs and private insurance plans into a loosely
knit but near universal healthcare payment system. This framework combines
aspects of several conceptions of insurance to create a peculiarly American form of
social insurance distinct from any single conception. 144
The ACA is intended to provide near-universal health insurance coverage for
the purpose of enabling Americans to obtain needed medical care. In this respect,
health insurance performs a governance function by financing and distributing
healthcare. The ACA seeks greater consistency in health insurance coverage by
regulating the terms of most plans. Such requirements bear some resemblance to
product standards in a product conception of insurance. The ACA also regulates the
commercial practices of private insurers, suggesting that private health insurance
industry is being treated—and should be regulated to some extent—like a modern
public utility.
The requirement that private health insurance plans sold on the new health
insurance exchanges cover Essential Health Benefits is a major step toward greater
consistency in coverage across the population. However, that requirement does not
apply to all health plans, and the current definition of Essential Health Benefits lacks
specification. As a result, decisions about covered care at the patient level will
continue to be made by many different decision makers, just as they are now. Each
decision maker, whether public or private, will continue to determine—according to
different rules of procedure and interpretation—whether the general categories of
benefits include something that a provider recommends or a patient seeks. At the
level of payment for patient care, health insurance is likely to operate within the
contract conception of insurance.
The ACA should challenge us to think in terms of a new conception of health
insurance that could help answer the remaining questions about how to regulate
insurers and their plans. Abraham warns that no single conception of insurance
provides fully developed normative standards, at least for interpreting the meaning
of insurance policies. 145 Yet, the ACA has taken the first step in the process to
provide general standards for health insurance coverage. The next step is to
reevaluate the normative standards in insurance law that govern what insurers must
do for insureds at the level of patient care.
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